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  Sven Ove Hansson
Abstract
According to the strongest version of aesthetic functionalism,
aesthetic value is completely determined by and therefore
reducible to practical function. According to the opposite view,
function and aesthetic value are completely independent of
each other. Both these views are shown to be untenable, and
instead aesthetic dualism is defended. By this, I mean that
some aesthetic judgments that can legitimately be made
about an object refer to it under descriptions of its practical
function, whereas others refer to it, for instance, under
descriptions of its physical appearance. Since valuations of the
former type are in most cases positively correlated with
satisfaction of functional requirements, this amounts to a
defense of a radically weakened version of aesthetic
functionalism.
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1. Introduction
In "pure art," artworks such as paintings, poems, plays and
partitas are produced with the sole purpose of providing
aesthetic experiences. In architecture and industrial design,
objects are created with the intention to satisfy not only
aesthetic criteria but also, primarily, criteria of utility and
practical function. This combination gives rise to the crucial
issue of how the two types of value relate to each other. Is
practical function independent of aesthetics or are they in
some way connected?
This was a central issue in the functionalist movement in
architecture and design, one of the most influential artistic and
cultural movements of the early twentieth century. The term
'functionalism' is ambiguous, not least since the functionalist
movement contained diverse and partly contradictory artistic
and social tendencies.[1] Modernist architects and designers
had a difficult time fighting against influential conservative
enemies. They soon found that an efficient argumentative
strategy was to emphasize that their constructions were more
functional than traditional architecture and design. Hence,
even if the architecture of a house was largely based on
geometrical principles (and thus on "pure" aesthetic
considerations), it was more expedient to represent it as
based on principles of functionality. It is important, therefore,
to distinguish between functionalism as an historical
movement and the more limited "functionalist" viewpoint that
the aesthetic properties of an object depend on its
functionality. Here we will be concerned with the latter, but
statements by members of the functionalist movement will be
used to exemplify the positions analyzed.
Functionalism in this sense is much older than the functionalist
movement. In Xenophon's Symposium, Critoboulus says that
he can distinguish a beautiful object.

CRITOBOULUS: I know, at any rate, that a shield is beautiful,
as well as a sword and a spear.
SOCRATES: And how is it that, although none of these is
similar to the other, they are all beautiful?
CRITOBOULUS: If, by Zeus, they've all been wrought with a
view to the tasks for which we acquire them, or if they've
been well adapted by nature with a view to the things we
need, then these are beautiful.[2]
The most famous slogan of the functionalist movement was
"form follows function," whose originator was the American
architect Louis Sullivan. When introducing it, he made an
analogy with the forms and functions one can find in nature.
The form of the eagle's wing has been determined by its
function, and the same applies to other objects in nature.
"[F]orm ever follows function. This is the law. Shall we, then,
daily violate this law in our art?"[3]
2. The Reduction Thesis
The most far-reaching variant of functionalism can be called
the "reduction thesis." It consists in the claim that there is
nothing to aesthetics (beauty) in addition to what follows from
function. This has also been called "austere functionalism;" it
implies that aesthetic considerations are altogether
unnecessary, since aesthetics will be automatically taken care
of if function is dealt with adequately.[4] This view was
expressed by Wilhelm Wagenfeld in an article published in
1937. He described how he had developed a new lemon
squeezer by carefully trying out different forms in his "artistic
laboratory" until the most functional construction was found.
This construction was then selected for mass production. The
experiments performed on lemon squeezers were in his view
an aesthetic activity. "Being useful also means being
beautiful."[5]
An even clearer statement of the reduction thesis was made
by Herbert Read in 1941:
"We have produced a chair which is strong and comfortable,
but is it a work of art?
"The answer, according to my philosophy of art, is Yes. If an
object is made of appropriate materials to an appropriate
design and perfectly fulfils its function, then we need not
worry anymore about its aesthetic value: it is automatically a
work of art. Fitness for function is the modern definition of the
eternal quality we call beauty, and this fitness for function is
the inevitable result of an economy directed to use and not to
profit."[6]
The reduction thesis may be appealingly simple, but it is
fraught with difficulties. To begin with, it has problems in
dealing with pure art. Consider two objects that are both made
by the same glass-blower. One is a vase that is used to keep
flowers in, and the other an artwork called "pillar" that cannot
be used as a vase since it has a hole in its bottom. It so
happens that the two objects are strikingly similar to each
other. According to the reduction thesis, the aesthetic
properties of the vase are entirely determined by its function

as a vase. The "pillar," however, has no function (or rather, no
function that is prior to and independent of its aesthetic
properties). Therefore its aesthetic properties cannot be
derived in the same way as those of the vase. According to
ordinary aesthetic intuitions, there is much in common
between the aesthetic criteria that we apply to the vase and
those that we apply to the "pillar." A line that we find graceful
or elegant in one of them would probably be found to have the
same property in the other. The reduction thesis makes it
difficult to account for this, since it subsumes the aesthetic
properties of the vase under its function, that is not at all
shared by the "pillar."
Another problem for the reduction thesis is that practical
function underdetermines form or, in other words, that objects
that differ widely in their physical appearance can realize one
and the same practical function with equal efficiency.[7] Two
soup-plates may be equally useful (functional) but yet look
very different. According to the reduction thesis, they must
then satisfy aesthetic demands to the same degree, which is
implausible to say the least.[8]
Finally, it is not difficult to find examples of objects that
satisfy functionality to a high degree but yet would not be
taken to possess beauty or other positive aesthetic qualities.
Medical intubation devices are an example of this. In
Xenophon's Symposium, mentioned above, Socrates ridiculed
Critoboulus's functionalist account of beauty by showing how it
implied that Socrates himself was an unusually beautiful
person: his protruding eyes were better for seeing to the side
and his thick lips were better for kissing than those of other
people.
3. The Independence Thesis
Having found the reduction thesis untenable we can now turn
to its opposite, that may be called the "independence thesis."
According to this standpoint, aesthetic and practical values are
completely independent of each other. This view was
expressed very clearly by Immanuel Kant.[9] Since aesthetic
formalism requires the exclusion of practical value from
aesthetic considerations, it implies the independence thesis.
On the other hand, the independence thesis does not exclude,
for instance, expressive and representational values from
aesthetics, and therefore it does not imply aesthetic
formalism.
In the early twentieth century, the independence thesis was
defended by Hermann Muthesius in his attacks on the
functionalist movement. Muthesius noted that the functionalist
ideas coincided with "the artistic discovery of the works of
engineers, in which a particular form of beauty was suddenly
found, the 'beauty of purely useful form' as it was called."[10]
This he considered to be a fallacy. Engineering aimed at
producing functional objects, and that activity did not in itself
give rise to beauty.
"It is a mistaken idea to believe that it is fully sufficient for an
engineer to see to it that that the house, instrument, or
machine that he is constructing satisfies a purpose. It is even
more mistaken to believe in the saying, so often heard
nowadays, that if it fulfills a purpose then it is also beautiful.

Usefulness as such has nothing to do with beauty. Beauty is a
matter of form and nothing else, usefulness is purely the
matter of being serviceable."[11]
However, Muthesius was also eager to point out that beauty
and function are not contradictory; it is possible to combine
the two.[12] He even claimed that engineers who deny having
any artistic ambitions in their work may nevertheless be
unconsciously, instinctively, influenced by aesthetic criteria.
"It can however be assumed that even the engineer who
claims not to aim at a pleasing design will be unconsciously
influenced by the formal [= aesthetic] laws. He is after all a
man like others. . . This is why there are beautiful civil
engineering works, in addition to the ugly ones. The beautiful
constructions have been made by engineers with taste, the
ugly ones by engineers without taste."[13]
In more recent aesthetic discussions, the independence thesis
has not often been expressed. The same applies to the
reduction thesis. Apparently, although the relation between
aesthetic value and practical function is no less important
today than in the heyday of the functionalist movement,
theorizing has mostly gone in other directions. However, in a
discussion of the aesthetic appreciation of sport, David Best
claimed that non-aesthetic purpose is irrelevant for aesthetic
appreciation.[14]
It is not difficult to use examples to show how the
independence thesis goes too far in the direction opposite to
that of the reduction thesis. Perhaps the clearest
counterexamples are those that refer to the beauty of abstract
objects, such as mathematical proofs. A mathematician who
called a proof beautiful would almost certainly retract or at
least moderate that statement if the proof turned out to
contain irreparable mistakes. Similarly, someone who admires
the beauty of a scientific experiment does this under the
presumption that it actually works.[15] When a computer
program is called beautiful, this is usually because of its power
to accomplish a lot with surprisingly small means. This type of
beauty was called "machine beauty" by David Gelernter.[16]
Examples can also easily be found that refer to concrete,
technological objects. Few of us would admire the beauty of a
bicycle with oval wheels or a chair that falls apart if one sits on
it. Or rather, if we appreciate them aesthetically, then we
appreciate them as non-functional works of art, not as a
bicycle or chair. When we judge a chair aesthetically, we
typically make assessments of it that relate to its function as a
chair.[17] That an object is, for instance, a "beautiful chair"
does not only mean that it is both beautiful and a chair. It
means that it is beautiful as a chair.
4. The Thesis of Aesthetic Duality
This leads us to an intermediate standpoint between the
reduction and the independence theses: When an object has a
purpose or practical function, then some but not necessarily all
the aesthetic judgments that can legitimately be made about
the object refer to that function. We do not need to require,
and will not require, that this categorization of the aesthetic
judgments be known by the agent. An agent with a high

capability of introspective aesthetic reflection may, at least in
principle, be able to distinguish between the two types of
judgments by bracketing her knowledge of the object's
practical function and judging it as a pure object of art. Other
agents may not be able to do this, but can nevertheless be
said to make both types of judgment.
The distinction between the two types of aesthetic judgment
can be further clarified with the help of the theory of the dual
nature of technological objects that has been developed by the
philosophers of technology, Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers.
They have shown that technological objects can be described
in two ways. First, they can be described as physical objects
(such and such an object of copper adjacent to such and such
an object of polyethylene, etc.). Second, they can be
described as functional objects with practical functions
assigned to them by the humans who constructed them (nail,
screwdriver, car, etc.).[18] The implication for aesthetics is
that aesthetic appraisals of such an object can refer to it
either under a description of its physical appearance or under
a description of its practical function. For a fully general
account, other types of descriptions such as those indicating
expressive or representational properties should be included,
so that the final distinction will be between descriptions of the
object that refer to its practical function and descriptions that
refer to its other properties. The latter category includes
descriptions of the object's physical, expressive and
representational properties.[19]
This distinction should not be treated as one between
functional and non-functional properties. The reason for this is
that non-practical functions of an object can be aesthetically
relevant. The representational properties, for instance, of a
portrait can be described in terms of its representational
function. Indeed, art can in general be characterized by its
function to provide aesthetic satisfaction.[20] According to this
approach, pure aesthetic judgments differ from judgments of
practical function by referring to another type of function,
namely aesthetic function. Currently, aesthetic functions are
under debate from at least two points of view: whether works
of art have aesthetic functions and whether the notion of art
can be defined in terms of such functions.[21] However,
neither of these issues seems to have any direct bearing on
the relation between practical function and aesthetic value.
These are separate issues. For our present purposes, we can
leave the issues concerning aesthetic function open.
It should now be clear why our aesthetic appraisal of a chair
depends on our knowledge that it is a chair: we make
aesthetic appraisals of it as an object with a practical function.
However, it can also be seen from the above example with the
vase and the pillar that an object with a practical function can
have aesthetic properties that do not refer to its practical
function. We can call this the aesthetic duality of objects with
practical function.
This thesis of aesthetic duality, as we have presented it,
allows practical function to influence aesthetic value but says
nothing about the nature of that influence. A further thesis will
therefore be added: the contributory thesis. It holds that
aesthetic valuations that refer to a practical function are in

most cases positively correlated with satisfaction of that
function. Hence, if two nutcrackers are equally nice to look at
for someone who does not know what they are meant for, but
only one of them is practically useful whereas the other breaks
before the nut, then the former is aesthetically the most
satisfying one. In this case and many others like it, the part of
the aesthetic judgment that concerns practical function
includes reference to the object from a dynamic point of view,
i.e., to its movements when used for its intended practical
purpose. The other part of the aesthetic judgment is, in typical
cases, more focused on the object's static, or statuesque,
properties.
The contributory thesis is not without exceptions. It holds true
for objects with practical functions that are morally accepted,
but not in general for objects with immoral practical functions.
In other words, the satisfaction of immoral functional
requirements does not necessarily add to an object's aesthetic
value. A person who admires what she believes to be a
surgical instrument may very well cease to see any beauty in
it upon learning that it is in fact an unusually efficient
instrument of torture. This is parallel to a well-known problem
in the representational arts. To the extent that we aesthetically
appreciate Leni Riefenstahl's (1902-2003) Nazi propaganda
film Triumph of the Will (1935), this is a more guarded and
restricted appreciation than our appreciation of a film with a
less abhorrent message. Several accounts have been given of
the dependence of aesthetics on ethics that is exhibited in
cases like this.[22] One plausible component of such
explanations is that the message is so integrated in
Riefenstahl's film that no judgment of the film, aesthetic or
otherwise, can disregard it or abstract from it.[23] Similarly,
once we know the intended use of a torture instrument, it is
part of what our aesthetic judgment of the instrument refers
to. Our negative ethical appraisal of Riefenstahl's message, or
of the intended use of the instrument, seems to block the
formation of any unconditional aesthetic appraisal.[24] The
nature of this blockage is far from clear and deserves further
study.
Aesthetic dualism, as outlined here, has an obvious similarity
to Kant's distinction between free and dependent beauty.[25]
The latter notion is notoriously difficult to interpret.[26] Some
modern interpretations treat dependent beauty as a limited
variant of free (pure) beauty; hence, according to one such
account, our appreciation of a beautiful spoon differs from how
we appreciate a beautiful statue: In the former case we
appreciate the extra skill required in producing an aesthetically
appealing object when it must at the same time have a
specific non-aesthetic function. These limitations can force the
artist to be more creative, and our knowledge of them may
therefore enhance our appreciation of the object.[27] (This is
not unlike the restriction on representational art that it has to
resemble a given object or represent it in some other
way.[28]) Our thesis of aesthetic duality differs from this
interpretation of Kant's distinction, since the latter seems to
preclude simultaneous appreciation of one and the same
object in both ways. It may conform with other interpretations
of Kant's distinction.
5. Conclusion

In summary, we have rejected two theses about the
relationship between aesthetics and practical function, namely
the reduction and independence theses. Aesthetic value is
neither fully reducible to practical function nor completely
independent of it. Instead we have defended a thesis of
aesthetic duality, according to which objects with practical
functions can be aesthetically appraised both under
descriptions that refer to these practical functions and under
descriptions not doing so. Finally, we have defended the
contributory thesis according to which satisfaction of functional
requirements in most cases contributes positively to aesthetic
value. Hence, some support can be found for aesthetic
functionalism, but only for a very weak form of it.
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